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Abstract 
   The Asian financial and currency crisis triggered a significant change to the currency composition of 
private liabilities in Thailand. Namely, the Thai private sector switched the denominations from the US dollar 
to the yen and at a larger percentage to the home currency (the Thai baht). The private sectors elsewhere in 
the Asia-Pacific region also switched from the US dollar to home currencies. Japanese banks resident in 
Thailand increased their local claims in the Thai baht; Japanese banks also increased the share of local 
currencies elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region; and the same is true with the non-Japanese banks as they 
increased the share of local currencies in the region. Countries in the region examined the crisis and their 
heavy dependency on the US dollar. Their currency switch can be construed as a movement away from that 
dependency. The author believes that such a movement should not be temporary, but should firmly take root. 
 
                                                         
 
I .  The Asian financial and currency crisis triggered changes in the currency 




   Since near the end of 1995, Thailand’s private sector has increasingly borrowed the Japanese 
yen. The trend is evident in Table 1, which breaks down Thai external debts by sector and 
currency. Before 1995, yen-denominated external debts actually accounted for a marginal share of 
private borrowing, while recording a prominent percentage of public debts as the latter reflected 
Japan’s official economic assistance to the country. However, after 1995 and particularly after the 
Asian financial and currency crisis hit Thailand, the private sector’s needs for the yen grew both in 
ratio and amount, whereas its demand for the US dollar declined. This new trend indicates that 92  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review 
the private sector shifted some of its external debts from US dollars to the yen.   
      In Thailand, according to reports and statistics issued by the Bank of Thailand (BOT), private 
external debts are categorized into those incurred by two sub-sectors: the banking sector and the 
non-banking sector. The banking sector is further classified into “BIBF” (Bangkok International 
Banking Facilities) and “Commercial Banks.” Before the crisis, the above two sub-sectors were 
combined in terms of sectoral and currency breakdowns. As a result, one could not numerically 
determine how much of the boost in the yen-denominated liabilities came from which of the two 
sub-sectors.  
   Table 1 is compiled based on various issues of Annual Economic Report (hereafter called AER) 
released by the Bank of Thailand. The following were what the author could extract from the data 
relevant to this paper and available in AER’s statistics on the external debts of the Thai private 
sector. First, concerning the data from end-1989 to end-1992, AER covered the non-banking 
sector. The banking sector was not included. For the next three years from end-1993 to end-1995, 
both the banking and non-banking sectors were covered. Note, however, that those two 
sub-sectors were treated as one group. In addition, in the banking sector, BIBF was counted in, 
while Commercial Banks were counted out. Finally, from end-1996 to end-1999, AER 
encompassed the non-banking sector and the entire banking sector (which included BIBF and 
Commercial Banks). Here again, the banking and non-banking sectors were combined into one 
group. Therefore, sectoral and currency breakdowns within the private sector were not available 
from end-1993 to end-1999.
1) Due to those constraints, “Total” amounts of the private sector in 
Table 1 respectively cover (1) only the non-banking sector from end-1989 to end-1992; (2) the 
non-banking sector and BIBF from end-1993 to end-1995; and (3) the non-banking sector and the 
entire banking sector (including BIBF plus Commercial Banks) from end-1996 to end-1999.  
      Having gone through the turmoil of the Asian crisis, the Bank of Thailand found it necessary to 
look more closely at private external liabilities and refined its data collection from the 
non-banking sector. BOT used to select 500 to 600 companies as samples, but in 1998 it began to 
collect data from all the companies that had been engaged in foreign exchange transactions related 
to external debts for the past ten years.
2) The findings from the new method are reflected in the 
recent reports of BOT.
3) A currency breakdown of the non-banking sector is also available in those 
reports. In addition, with the permission of the Bank of Thailand, the author was able to avail 
himself of chronological data on the banking sector’s external debts. Those data and the recent 
reports form the basis for the analysis in this paper.
           
1)  B a n k   o f   T h a i l a n d   [ 1 ] .  
2)    This information is based on the author’s interviews with the Bank of Thailand, and Bank of Thailand [2]. 
































































Table 1  Thailand's External Debts by Sector and Currency ※
Unit：%, (in millions of US$)
At
year-end
1989 42.0 4,975) (      44.5 5,263) (      13.5 1,594) (      100 11,832) (    80.7 6,122) (      6.2 474) (        13.0 989) (        100 7,585) (      57.2 11,097) (    29.5 5,737) (      13.3 2,583) (      100 19,417) (   
1990 37.9 4,359) (      46.8 5,382) (      15.4 1,769) (      100 11,510) (    85.5 11,591) (    6.6 890) (        7.9 1,070) (      100 13,551) (    63.6 15,950) (    25.0 6,272) (      11.3 2,839) (      100 25,061) (   
1991 38.8 4,972) (      48.2 6,178) (      12.9 1,658) (      100 12,808) (    90.1 18,457) (    5.1 1,037) (      4.8 982) (        100 20,476) (    70.4 23,429) (    21.7 7,215) (      7.9 2,640) (      100 33,284) (   
1992 39.4 5,148) (      48.8 6,381) (      11.8 1,539) (      100 13,068) (    90.9 22,070) (    4.4 1,058) (      4.8 1,158) (      100 24,286) (    72.9 27,218) (    19.9 7,439) (      7.2 2,697) (      100 37,354) (   
1993 37.5 5,318) (      52.1 7,384) (      10.4 1,469) (      100 14,171) (    89.6 28,271) (    4.8 1,513) (      5.6 1,754) (      100 31,538) (    73.5 33,589) (    19.5 8,897) (      7.1 3,223) (      100 45,709) (   
1994 38.5 6,052) (      51.3 8,057) (      10.2 1,605) (      100 15,714) (    92.6 36,375) (    3.8 1,493) (      3.6 1,419) (      100 39,287) (    77.1 42,427) (    17.4 9,550) (      5.5 3,019) (      100 54,996) (   
1995 41.7 6,846) (      50.9 8,344) (      7.4 1,212) (      100 16,402) (    91.5 47,324) (    5.7 2,931) (      2.9 1,475) (      100 51,730) (    79.5 54,170) (    16.5 11,275) (    3.9 2,687) (      100 68,132) (   
1996 46.2 7,762) (      47.0 7,904) (      6.8 1,139) (      100 16,805) (    86.9 64,101) (    10.7 7,853) (      2.4 1,777) (      100 73,731) (    79.4 71,863) (    17.4 15,757) (    3.2 2,916) (      100 90,536) (   
1997 50.3 12,238) (    35.9 8,738) (      13.8 3,347) (      100 24,323) (    78.5 54,222) (    20.7 14,284) (    0.8 587) (        100 69,092) (    71.1 66,460) (    24.6 23,022) (    4.2 3,934) (      100 93,415) (   
1998 47.6 14,991) (    39.2 12,357) (    13.2 4,161) (      100 31,509) (    69.8 38,142) (    29.5 16,105) (    0.7 404) (        100 54,651) (    61.7 53,133) (    33.0 28,462) (    5.3 4,565) (      100 86,160) (   
1999 n.a. (      n.a.)  n.a. (      n.a.)  n.a. (      n.a.)  100 36,527) (    n.a. (      n.a.)  n.a. (      n.a.)  n.a. (      n.a.)  100 39,052) (    55   (      n.a.)  39   (      n.a.)  6   (      n.a.)  100 75,579) (   
Notes：　※：The figures are the total of short-term and long-term external debts.
           　n.a.：not available. The sectoral and currency composition as above has not been released since 2000.
Sources： Bank of Thailand, Annual Economic Report, various issues.
Total Total Total US Dollar Yen Others
Public Sector Private Sector Total





































Table 2  Thailand's Private External Debts by Sector and Currency ※
Unit：%, (in millions of US$)
Sectors At year-end Yen US Dollar Total
1994 4.0 1,119) (   94.0 26,297) (  b.2.0  100 27,976) ( 
1995 9.0 3,775) (   89.0 37,326) (  b.2.0  100 41,939) ( 
1996 15.0 6,280) (   83.0 34,751) (  b.2.0  100 41,869) ( 
1997 23.5 9,217) (   74.5 29,220) (  b.2.0  100 39,221) ( 
1998 34.6 9,799) (   63.4 17,956) (  b.2.0  100 28,322) ( 
1999 45.0 7,966) (   53.0 9,382) (   b.2.0  100 17,702) ( 
2000 48.3 5,872) (   49.7 6,042) (   b.2.0  100 12,157) ( 
2001 45.6 4,271) (   53.1 4,968) (   1.2 115) (     100 9,354) (  
2002 44.2 3,601) (   54.8 4,463) (   0.9 72) (      100 8,136) (  
2003 42.9 3,026) (   54.3 3,823) (   2.8 196) (     100 7,045) (  
1994 3.6 620) (     91.4 15,744) (  5.0 100 17,225) ( 
1995 1.9 727) (     94.3 36,101) (  3.8 100 38,283) ( 
1996 4.9 2,254) (   92.1 42,375) (  3.0 100 46,010) ( 
1997 16.9 7,027) (   83.8 34,846) (  -0.7 100 41,582) ( 
1998 13.7 5,689) (   79.2 32,777) (  7.1 2,927) (   100 41,394) ( 
1999 16.2 5,987) (   77.2 28,496) (  6.6 2,447) (   100 36,930) ( 
2000 12.8 3,885) (   76.2 23,114) (  11.0 3,347) (   100 30,346) ( 
2001 10.0 2,664) (   73.2 19,396) (  16.8 4,452) (   100 26,512) ( 
2002 11.4 2,763) (   65.2 15,841) (  23.5 5,707) (   100 24,311) ( 
2003 12.5 3,017) (   56.2 13,609) (  31.4 7,601) (   100 24,227) ( 
1994 3.8 1,739) (   93.0 42,041) (  3.2 100 45,201) ( 
1995 5.6 4,502) (   91.5 73,427) (  2.9 100 80,222) ( 
1996 9.7 8,535) (   87.8 77,126) (  2.5 100 87,879) ( 
1997 20.1 16,244) (  79.3 64,065) (  0.6 100 80,803) ( 
1998 22.2 15,488) (  72.8 50,733) (  5.0 100 69,716) ( 
1999 25.5 13,953) (  69.3 37,878) (  5.2 100 54,632) ( 
2000 23.0 9,757) (   68.6 29,156) (  8.4 100 42,503) ( 
2001 19.3 6,935) (   67.9 24,364) (  12.7 4,567) (   100 35,866) ( 
2002 19.6 6,364) (   62.6 20,304) (  17.8 5,779) (   100 32,447) ( 
2003 19.3 6,043) (   55.7 17,432) (  24.9 7,797) (   100 31,272) ( 
Notes： ※：The amount of trade credit is excluded from the debts of the non-banking sector (i.e., the debts of the non-
　　　　       banking sector from 1994 to 1997 exclude the amount of trade credit that was included in the data of Annual
　　　　       Economic Report released by the Bank of Thailand.).
　　　　       The above figures of the non-banking sector in/after end-1998 are respectively based on BOT's data adjusted
　　　　       after its new data collection. Also, BOT's data from end-1995 to end-1997 are adjusted to reflect its new data
　　　　       collection.
               b.：below.
Sources： The author's interviews with Bank of Thailand, Bank of Thailand, Economic and Financial Statistics, various
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   T a b l e  2  
4) takes advantage of the above data to enumerate the sectoral and currency 
composition of private external debts in chronological order. The table shows that the share of the 
yen in both the banking and non-banking sectors has risen, and conversely the share of US dollars 
in the two sub-sectors has fallen. Noteworthy is a soaring need for the yen by the banking sector, 
in which the ratio of the yen nearly matched that of the dollar at end-2000. Another conspicuous 
development, which has occurred since the Asian financial and currency crisis, is the growing 
share of “Other Currencies” of the non-banking sector. In this paper, the author examines changes 
observed in the currency composition of Thai private external debts and explains why such 
changes took place. 
 
1.    A rising share of yen-denominated private external debts in Thailand 
 
(1)  Private  banking  sector 
 
      Table 3 compares the share of “BIBF Assets” (Bangkok International Banking Facilities: Assets) 
held by Thai and foreign banks located in Thailand vis-à-vis the total “BIBF Assets.” Japanese 
banks accounted for 50% or more of the total. In fact, the author wished to obtain data on 













           
4)    Table 2 needs some more explanation. Through his interviews with the Bank of Thailand, the author obtained the 
following information on the currency composition of the banking sector for the period from 1994 to 2000: (1) the ratios of 
the yen as shown in the table, (2) the annual ratio of Other Currencies being less than 2%, and (3) the US dollar 
constituting the remainder each year during the period. Thus, the author set the annual ratio of Other Currencies at 2% 
from 1994 to 2000 respectively and calculated the yearly ratio of the US dollar accordingly. 
    Concerning the currency composition of the non-banking sector from 1994 to 1997, the author deducted the liabilities of 
the banking sector (as computed above) from the total of the private sector (listed in Table 1) for each year during the 
corresponding period. The ratio of Other Currencies of the non-banking sector at end-1997 in Table 2 turned out oddly in 
the negative. This is because the calculated amount of Other Currencies corresponding to the above 2% is deducted from 
the amount of Other Currencies of the private sector in Table 1. However, this discrepancy does not pose a hindrance to 
giving an overall picture of the trends in the currency composition of the private sector. 
Table 3　Share of BIBF Assets held by Japanese Banks in Thailand vis-à-vis Total BIBF Assets
Unit：%, (in millions of Thai Baht)
At
year-end
1994 35.9 203,595) (     64.1 362,982) (     48.4 274,352) (     100 566,576) (    
1995 22.4 269,088) (     77.6 930,735) (     65.5 785,598) (     100 1,199,823) (  
1996 27.1 352,003) (     72.9 945,619) (     59.3 769,822) (     100 1,297,622) (  
1997 29.1 554,064) (     70.9 1,348,692) (   53.3 1,013,670) (   100 1,902,756) (  
1998 26.2 239,285) (     73.8 675,359) (     54.0 493,892) (     100 914,644) (    
1999 21.4 113,355) (     78.6 417,162) (     53.1 281,440) (     100 530,518) (    
2000 16.4 66,721) (      83.6 339,865) (     57.1 232,046) (     100 406,586) (    
2001 14.6 41,677) (      85.4 244,674) (     53.2 152,407) (     100 286,351) (    
2002 16.1 34,729) (      83.9 180,812) (     54.2 116,741) (     100 215,541) (    
2003 19.4 35,549) (      80.6 147,500) (     49.9 91,320) (      100 183,049) (    
Sources ： Bangkok Bank, Commercial Banks in Thailand, various issues.
Thai Banks Foreign Banks
Japanese Banks
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Although BOT releases reports on “BIBF Liabilities,” data relevant to this paper are not available. 
Thus, the author used the data on “BIBF Assets” instead, as they would serve the purpose because 
of a general correspondence found between assets and liabilities in this respect. It will be 
reasonable to posit, therefore, that Japanese banks in Thailand also comprised the majority of the 
liabilities in BIBF during the corresponding period. 
      Table 4 lists the sectoral breakdown of private external debts, by which one can compare the 
ratios of Commercial Banks with those of BIBF. Some Japanese banks resident in Thailand are 
certified to operate as full branches, meaning that they can operate as full-fledged commercial 
banks like their Thai counterparts. Other Japanese banks are limited to the BIBF business alone. 
On the above-mentioned assumption that Japanese banks constituted the majority of the 
liabilities in BIBF, the following inference is possible: If Japanese banks with the full-branch status 
accounted for 50% or more of Commercial Banks’ external debts, the Japanese banks in Thailand 
would be responsible for 50% or more of the external debts of the entire banking sector. On the 
other hand, if the share of the Japanese banks with the full-branch status was nil in the external 
debts of Commercial Banks, the Japanese banks in Thailand would be responsible for about 40% of 
the external debts of the entire banking sector. 
      Who in the banking sector borrowed the Japanese yen? Refer to Table 2 again. The ratios of the 
yen were, for instance, 45.0% at end-1999, 48.3% at end-2000, and 45.6% at end-2001. If the 
borrowers were Japanese banks in Thailand that needed the yen for fundraising, it would mean 
that 90% to 100% of the funds raised by them were denominated in the yen at least after 1999. If 
that is the case, it follows that when those Japanese banks financed their clients in Thailand with 
funds raised outside the country, the banks borrowed the yen, instead of US dollars, in almost all 
















Table 4　Thailand's Private External Debts by Sector ※
Unit：%, (in millions of US$)
At Banking Sector
year-end
1989 29.4 3,158) (    -          - )  (       29.4 3,158) (    70.6 7,585) (    100 10,743) (  
1990 23.8 4,233) (    -          - )  (       23.8 4,233) (    76.2 13,560) (   100 17,793) (  
1991 17.9 4,477) (    -          - )  (       17.9 4,477) (    82.1 20,591) (   100 25,068) (  
1992 20.5 6,263) (    -          - )  (       20.5 6,263) (    79.5 24,290) (   100 30,553) (  
1993 13.9 5,279) (    20.4 7,740) (    34.3 13,019) (   65.7 24,917) (   100 37,936) (  
1994 20.1 9,865) (    36.8 18,111) (   56.9 27,976) (   43.1 21,176) (   100 49,152) (  
1995 17.1 14,436) (   32.6 27,503) (   49.7 41,939) (   50.3 42,491) (   100 84,430) (  
1996 11.6 10,682) (   33.9 31,187) (   45.5 41,869) (   54.5 50,072) (   100 91,941) (  
1997 10.7 9,141) (    35.3 30,080) (   46.0 39,221) (   54.0 45,973) (   100 85,194) (  
1998 8.8 6,486) (    29.7 21,836) (   38.5 28,322) (   61.5 45,162) (   100 73,484) (  
1999 7.8 4,596) (    22.3 13,106) (   30.1 17,702) (   69.9 41,121) (   100 58,823) (  
2000 8.6 3,921) (    18.0 8,236) (    26.5 12,157) (   73.5 33,645) (   100 45,802) (  
2001 8.3 3,262) (    15.5 6,092) (    23.9 9,354) (    76.1 29,849) (   100 39,203) (  
2002 8.2 2,963) (    14.3 5,173) (    22.5 8,136) (    77.5 28,018) (   100 36,154) (  
2003 8.0 2,790) (    12.2 4,255) (    20.2 7,045) (    79.8 27,779) (   100 34,824) (  
Notes： ※：The amount of trade credit is included in the debts of the non-banking sector. The above figures of the  non-banking sector in/
         after end -1998 respectively reflect the adjustments BOT made to its data collection. Also, BOT's data from end-1995 to end -
                     1997 are adjusted to reflect its new data collection.
Sources： Bank of Thailand, Economic and Financial Statistics, various issues.
Total
Commercial Banks BIBF Total
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would suggest that Thai and other foreign banks operating in Thailand also borrowed the yen to 
lend it. The former would likely be the case, though this assumption needs further investigation. 
 
(2)  Private  non-banking sector 
 
   A s  i n  T a b l e  2 ,  t h e  n o n -banking sector also reduced the ratio of US dollars to the total 
non-banking external debts, whereas it increased the yen’s share -- albeit the degree of the change 
is smaller than that of the banking sector. In this section, the author examines private 



















   Table 5 shows creditor countries and regions to compare the ratio of each creditor to the 
non-banking external liabilities. In the case of Japanese banks, those resident outside Thailand 
financed the Thai non-banking sector from Japan as well as from their branches in Singapore and 
Hong Kong. This relates to the history of the BIBF program in Thailand. Before BIBF was 
introduced in March 1993, the then Mitsui Bank and Bank of Tokyo were the only two that were 
certified for full-branch operations in Thailand. Other Japanese banks, when they financed the 
non-banking sector, had to lend through their headquarters in Japan or their branches in 
Singapore and Hong Kong. In 1993, as listed in Table 6, six more Japanese banks were qualified to 
finance the non-banking sector under the BIBF program. In November 1996, three of the six 
Japanese banks joined the above two to operate as full branches, and two new ones began the BIBF 
business. Since the launch of BIBF, the roles of Japanese branches in Singapore and Hong Kong 
Table 5　Thailand's Private Non-bank External Debts by Creditor ※
Unit：%, (in millions of US$)
Creditors 2000 2001 2002 2003
Japan 25.4 7,084) (     26.5 6,183) (     27.0 5,445) (     23.2 4,289) (    
Singapore 20.7 5,780) (     17.3 4,041) (     15.3 3,097) (     14.9 2,760) (    
United States 12.0 3,347) (     12.4 2,884) (     12.1 2,449) (     12.2 2,260) (    
Germany 7.2 2,021) (     9.1 2,112) (     9.6 1,940) (     9.3 1,728) (    
Hong Kong 5.6 1,554) (     5.7 1,324) (     5.3 1,066) (     8.0 1,477) (    
Netherlands 3.5 975) (       0.7 153) (       1.6 324) (       3.1 567) (      
United Kingdom 3.1 870) (       4.7 1,093) (     5.4 1,085) (     4.9 899) (      
Republic of Korea 2.5 694) (       1.7 387) (       1.1 222) (       1.0 186) (      
France 2.1 596) (       3.0 689) (       4.4 880) (       3.9 729) (      
Finland 1.4 399) (       1.5 356) (       1.8 361) (       n.a. (    n.a.) 
Switzerland 1.2 344) (       2.0 457) (       2.1 422) (       2.4 444) (      
Taiwan, Province of China 1.0 279) (       1.0 231) (       1.2 242) (       1.3 242) (      
Australia 0.6 173) (       0.4 87) (        n.a. (    n.a.)  0.7 128) (      
Other 13.7 3,814) (     14.1 3,295) (     13.2 2,656) (     15.0 2,780) (    
Total 100 27,929) (    100 23,292) (    100 20,189) (    100 18,489) (   
Notes： ※：Based on the data at year-end. Trade credit and Baht-denominated debts are excluded.
            n.a.：not available.
Sources： Bank of Thailand, Economic and Financial Statistics, various issues.98  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review 
have been presumably minimized. Under such circumstances, as creditors of the non-banking 
sector how much did Japanese banks and other Japanese entities 
5) located outside Thailand 
account for? Take the year 2000 for example (see Table 5). If all the loans from Japan (accounting 
for 25.4%) and one-fourth each from Singapore and Hong Kong (accounting for 20.7% and 5.6% 
respectively) were provided by the Japanese banks and other Japanese entities, they would 
account for 31.9% of the non-banking external debts. If all from Japan but half each from 
Singapore and Hong Kong were financed by the Japanese banks and entities, the Japanese banks 














      Based on the above figures (31.9% and 38.5%), we now look at Japanese companies operating in 
Thailand, who are large non-banking borrowers in that country. It is assumed that the debts they 
owed to the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) under the Overseas Investment 
Loans made up a large portion of the Thai non-banking external debts. Since the focus of this 
paper is on private financing, official financing must be excluded from the discussion. To do so, we 
need to review the Overseas Investment Loans (hereafter called ‘OI Loans’) program first. In and 
after 1995, Japanese banks burdened with bad loans found it difficult to maintain their interbank 
credit lines and were deadlocked in borrowing US dollars in the international financial markets. 
At the time of the Asian crisis, not only the affected nations and regions but also Japanese 
companies there had a hard time borrowing US dollars. 
6) That was because (1) the sales of the 
Japanese companies deteriorated in the aftermath of the crisis, and (2) Japanese banks could not 
finance Japanese businesses because the banks themselves could not procure US dollars. The then 
Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM Bank), the predecessor of JBIC, ordinarily had granted loans 
under the OI Loans program to Japanese companies that would build factories and/or be engaged 
           
5)    Japanese entities include Japanese manufacturers’ head offices that provided inter-office loans to their affiliates in 
Thailand. The author assumes that when Japanese banks and manufacturers financed the non-banking sector from outside 
Thailand, they did so solely from their offices in Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
6)    Inoue, Ichiro [5], p.112. 
Table 6　Japanese Banks located in Thailand by Status
Periods Full Branch Status BIBF Status
 The Mitsui Bank  The Industrial Bank of Japan
 The Bank of Tokyo  The Mitsubishi Bank
March 1993  The Sumitomo Bank
 The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank
 The Sanwa Bank
 The Long-term Credit Bank of Japan
 The Sakura Bank  Fuji Bank
 The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi  The Sanwa Bank
November 1996  The Industrial Bank of Japan  Tokai Bank
 The Sumitomo Bank
 The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank
Source： Ministry of Finance of Thailand.  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review  99 
 
in resource development projects in the loan recipient countries. 
7) At the time of the crisis, JEXIM 
Bank decided to take the unusual measure of trying to save Japanese companies in Asia from going 
bankrupt by financing them. This action greatly boosted the amount of the OI Loans during the 
crisis. The commitments under this program shot up from ¥696.7 billion in 1996 to ¥894.9 billion 
in 1997, to ¥1,576.8 billion in 1998, and finally fell to ¥544.8 billion in 1999. In the peak years of 
1997 and 1998, the ratios of US dollars to the total commitments were 87.2% and 86.2% 
respectively, and the rest were in the yen. Concerning Japanese companies operating in Thailand, 
JEXIM Bank committed 30.4 billion yen to them from July 1997 to end-March 2000 (which, as 
noted above, was the ordinary basis of the program). In addition, during the same period, JEXIM 
Bank committed a sum of 380.2 billion yen to help them weather the crisis. Thus, the total 
committed was ¥410.6 billion, 
8) which amounts to US $3,879.07 million at the exchange rate of 
105.85 yen to the dollar (at end-March 2000). This is the amount we need to exclude from the 
total external loans extended by the Japanese banks and other Japanese entities noted earlier. The 
ratio of Japanese private financing (i.e., by Japanese banks and companies located outside 
Thailand) to the Thai non-banking sector would be 18.0% when the OI Loans are deducted from 
the above-mentioned 31.9%, or 24.6% when deducted from the 38.5%.   
      With those ratios (18.0% and 24.6%) in mind, we go back to Table 2 to take a closer look at the 
yen’s share. In the case of end-2000 in the table, the yen’s ratio to the non-banking external debts 
was 12.8%. However, this figure includes OI Loans that Japanese companies borrowed from JEXIM 
Bank. We need to exclude such loans to obtain the share of purely private financing. The amount 
of yen-denominated OI Loans was ¥56.7 billion, or US $535.31 million, which is calculated by 
deducting the dollar-denominated OI Loans (the above 86.2%) from the total commitments of 
¥410.6 billion (also mentioned above). If the yen-denominated official financing at the end of 2000 
amounted to ¥56.7 billion (US $535.31 million), the amount would account for approximately 
0.8% of the 12.8% listed in Table 2. The share of private financing vis-à-vis the 12.8% (which 
includes OI Loans) at end-2000, therefore, would be 12%. 
9)  
      Finally, based on this figure, we can find out how much of the Japanese private cross-border 
loans to the Thai non-banking sector was made in the yen. As calculated earlier, Japanese banks 
and companies are assumed to have accounted for 18.0% or 24.6% of the Thai non-banking 
external debts. If the above 12% was all attributed to the Japanese banks and companies, their 
yen-denominated loans would account for 66.5% (12.0÷18.0) or 48.7% (12.0÷24.6) of the 
external loans they provided for the Thai non-banking sector. The former (66.5%) is more likely, 
because it is hard to imagine that the Japanese banks claimed half of the loans from Singapore and 
Hong Kong to the Thai non-banking sector. 
 
           
7)  E x p o r t -Import Bank of Japan [6], p.4. 
8)  Export-Import Bank of Japan [7], Japan Bank for International Cooperation [8]. 
9)  T h e   b a h t -denominated debts are deducted from the total non-banking external debts. 100  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review 
(3)    Reasons behind the change in denominations of Thai private external debts 
 
   A close analysis of the currency composition of private external liabilities in Thailand shows 
that both the banking and non-banking sectors borrowed fewer US dollars and more Japanese yen. 
The calculations in the previous two sections clearly suggest that when Japanese banks located in 
Thailand raised funds outside Thailand to finance the Thai non-banking sector, the banks mostly 
borrowed the yen, instead of the US dollar. With regard to Japanese banks and companies located 
outside Thailand, the calculations also reveal that more than 60% of their loans to the Thai 
non-banking sector were in the yen, though more data are needed for a further analysis. Overall, 
compared with the currency composition of private external debts before Japanese banks saw 
their credit ratings dip in 1995 and before the crisis hit Asia in 1997, a significant change took place 
in Japanese banks’ international financing. What caused the change? In what context did the 
change take place?   
 
(1) Many Japanese banks saddled with bad loans were rated poorly as their credit risks rose, and 
they were deadlocked in borrowing US dollars in the international financial markets. Thus, the 
banks shifted from the US dollar to the Japanese yen in their international financing as 
borrowing one’s home currency is much easier in minimizing liquidity risk. Under such 
circumstances, what did Japanese banks operating in Thailand do? Table 7 shows 
chronological data on “Assets” and “Liabilities and Capital” of the Japanese banks in Thailand. 
All the funds raised by them are recorded under “Liabilities and Capital,” of which funds raised 
outside Thailand are categorized into either “BIBF Liabilities” under “Liabilities” or “Net 
Inter-Office Balances and Other” 
10) under “Capital.” After the widespread Japanese banking 
credit uneasiness and especially after the Asian crisis, the share of “BIBF Liabilities” drastically 
declined against a sharp rise in the share of “Net Inter-Office Balances and Other.” This 
development indicates that the Japanese banks in Thailand were not able to borrow US dollars 
in the BIBF offshore market and had to borrow the yen instead from their head offices in Japan.   
(2) The Asian crisis put an end to the fixed exchange rate system in Thailand, in which the Thai 
baht had been virtually pegged to the US dollar, and the baht began to fluctuate against the 
dollar. From the perspective of borrowers in Thailand, the US dollar became no longer a safe 
currency to ward off exchange risk. This is one compelling factor when borrowers decide 
which denomination to choose. In the wake of the Asian crisis, the baht began to fluctuate in 
tandem with the Japanese yen more often and more closely than before. Such a turnaround in 
the foreign exchange markets helped minimize exchange risk for the borrowers of the yen to 
repay their yen-denominated debts.   
           
10)    The figures under “Net Inter-Office Balances and Other” in Table 7 come almost entirely from the inter-office 
transactions between Japanese banks’ head offices and their branches in Thailand as the amount of “Other” was negligibly 

































































Table 7　Assets, Liabilities, and Capital of Japanese Banks in Thailand ※
Unit：%, (in millions of Thai Baht)
1992 100 48,799) (    *n.a. (   *n.a.) 88.7 43,273) (    29.2 14,266) (    *n.a. (   *n.a.) 11.3 5,526) (     8.3 4,030) (     3.1 1,496) (     
1993 100 75,296) (    n.a. (    n.a.) 92.3 69,521) (    23.1 17,379) (    n.a. (    n.a.) 7.7 5,775) (     5.6 4,200) (     2.1 1,575) (     
1994 100 103,971) (   45.9 47,688) (    86.7 90,145) (    18.4 19,148) (    38.5 40,056) (    13.3 13,826) (    4.5 4,700) (     8.8 9,126) (     
1995 100 133,495) (   53.1 70,920) (    77.1 102,903) (   15.5 20,753) (    45.3 60,443) (    22.9 30,592) (    4.3 5,800) (     18.6 24,792) (    
1996 100 205,988) (   68.0 140,115) (   61.9 127,531) (   13.7 28,180) (    39.2 80,802) (    38.1 78,457) (    3.7 7,707) (     34.3 70,750) (    
1997 100 863,841) (   84.5 730,285) (   41.2 355,957) (   7.1 61,568) (    32.8 283,423) (   58.8 507,884) (   2.0 17,281) (    56.8 490,603) (   
1998 100 492,332) (   78.7 387,631) (   37.7 185,671) (   14.6 71,713) (    21.7 106,842) (   62.3 306,661) (   #3.5 13,083) (    #60.0 224,256) (   
1999 100 355,518) (   62.0 220,388) (   33.9 120,493) (   24.8 88,258) (    3.5 12,326) (    66.1 235,025) (   4.7 16,568) (    61.4 218,457) (   
2000 100 357,336) (   49.1 175,493) (   43.2 154,335) (   29.9 106,696) (   2.5 9,073) (     56.8 203,001) (   6.6 23,498) (    50.2 179,503) (   
2001 100 318,961) (   39.7 126,617) (   54.1 172,437) (   39.4 125,725) (   5.3 16,887) (    45.9 146,524) (   9.9 31,637) (    36.0 114,887) (   
2002 100 288,027) (   33.4 96,317) (    55.5 159,905) (   45.5 131,163) (   1.1 3,212) (     44.5 128,122) (   10.8 31,088) (    33.7 97,034) (    
2003 100 274,619) (   26.5 72,715) (    62.7 172,141) (   47.5 130,549) (   2.1 5,870) (     37.3 102,478) (   11.2 30,744) (    26.1 71,734) (    
Notes： ※：The data are from Japanese banks with full branch status. “Net Inter-Office Balances” are classified into “Capital” in Thailand.
          *n.a.：not applicable.
            n.a.：not available.
                #：The data of one bank are excluded due to their inadequacy.
Sources： Bangkok Bank, Commercial Banks in Thailand, various issues.
At
year-end










































































3 months 6 months 12 months
1994 n.a. 6.56 n.a. n.a. 11.75 11.75 n.a. 5.00 8.75-10.00 8.25-10.00 8.25-10.25
1995 9.38 9.49 9.28 n.a. 14.00-14.25 13.75 14.00-14.50 5.00 10.50-12.50 10.25-11.00 10.25-11.00
1996 10.91 11.01 10.69 11.00 13.25-13.50 13.00-13.25 13.00-13.50 5.00 8.75-9.75 8.50-9.25 8.50-9.25
1997 22.87 22.36 22.19 17.98 15.75-16.00 15.25 15.50-16.00 5.00 10.00-11.50 10.00-11.50 10.00-13.00
1998 3.55 3.75 5.54 5.59 12.00-12.75 11.50-12.00 12.00-13.25 4.50 6.00 6.00 6.00
1999 0.63 0.94 2.44 2.94 8.75-9.00 8.25-8.50 8.50-9.00 3.00 3.75 3.75 4.00-4.25
2000 1.22 1.31 2.00 2.44 8.00-8.75 7.50-8.25 8.00-8.75 2.50 3.00 3.00 3.50
2001 2.12 2.20 2.49 2.63 7.50-8.00 7.00-7.50 7.50-8.00 1.75 2.25 2.25-2.50 2.75-3.00
2002 1.52 1.53 1.78 n.a. 6.50-7.50 6.50-7.00 6.50-7.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.00
2003 1.01 1.10 1.25 n.a. 5.75-6.00 5.50-5.75 5.75-6.25 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes： #：Average.
              *：Minimum Overdraft Rates.
              +：Minimum Loan Rates.
            ++：Minimum Retail Rates.
          n.a.：not available.
Sources： Bank of Thailand, Quarterly Bulletin, Vol.36, No.1, p.34, Economic and Financial Statistics, various issues.
Money market
Repurchase rates #
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(3) The yen’s interest rates lowering to zero also helped cut costs for borrowing the yen. This was 
again advantageous for the borrowers of the yen. 
(4) The lending rates of the baht plummeted to such an extent that no one would have imagined 
possible before the Asian crisis. Table 8 looks at the trends of interest rates of the baht. The 
lowering rates of the baht pushed down the premiums of the yen’s forward foreign exchanges, 
which allowed the costs of the yen’s forward exchanges to drop when the borrowers of the yen 
hedged exchange risk.   
 
      The above are the four main reasons that give a logical explanation to why the denominations 
of private external debts shifted from the US dollar to the Japanese yen. However, since the credit 
ratings of Japanese banks improved, it seems that Japanese banks in Thailand have become more 
competitive than before in lending US dollars. They can now swap their yen-denominated funds, 
raised through inter-office transactions, for US dollars at lower costs. In response to their clients’ 
needs, the banks can either lend the yen at hand or swap it for US dollars. Half of their lending is 
now probably done in the yen and the remaining in US dollars. 
11)  
      The increase in the yen-denominated loans from Japanese banks located in and out of Thailand 
to the Thai private sector reflects the vulnerability of Japanese banks as a whole. Yet, at the same 
time, yen-denominated loans served as a crucial means for Japanese banks to continue financing 
their clients in Thailand during the difficult period of their credit impairment and the Asian crisis. 
 
2.  A correlation between the denominations of Thai private external debts and 
export settlement currencies 
 
   Table 9 breaks down settlement currencies of Thai exports by trading partner. The share of 
yen-denominated exports to Japan increased after the crisis. The author earlier referred to forward 
foreign exchanges as a way for borrowers of the yen to hedge exchange risk when they repay their 
yen-denominated liabilities. In the case of exporters, there is another option to hedge exchange 
risk: to earn yen receipts from exports to repay their yen-denominated debts. As reiterated, the 
yen-denominated external debts of the Thai non-banking sector grew after the emergence of the 
bad loan problem in Japan and the Asian crisis. In the meantime, yen-denominated exports to 
Japan also increased because (1) in 1999, 2000, and 2003 the yen was appreciated vis-à-vis the US 
dollar as shown in Table 10, which was advantageous for yen-denominated exports; (2) the yen’s 
low interest rates helped decrease costs of trade financing; and as noted above (3) exporters 
undertook hedge operations by earning yen receipts to repay their yen-denominated debts. 
 
 
           








































Table 9　Thailand's Export Receipts by Currency and Trading Partner
Unit：%
Currencies Trading Partners 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 Japan 82.5 82.8 85.4 86.0 83.2 72.8 70.4 71.8 71.0 69.9
 United States 99.4 99.6 99.7 99.7 99.4 97.2 96.8 97.1 96.4 95.8
 EU 90.4 89.8 90.8 91.2 89.1 81.0 80.8 75.7 73.0 73.8
 ASEAN # 92.1 91.6 89.6 89.6 86.8 91.3 90.5 89.3 89.0 89.6
     Indochina * 78.5 79.5 80.0 74.6 75.2 69.3 73.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Middle East 95.7 98.9 42.0 90.8 75.7 68.6 67.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Eastern Europe 99.7 99.5 99.3 99.2 96.1 96.9 95.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 World 90.5 91.0 91.7 92.0 90.6 87.6 87.0 85.7 84.7 84.4
 Japan 15.5 15.1 13.2 12.7 14.0 19.5 21.6 20.5 20.9 21.5
 United States 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3
 EU 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 ASEAN # 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.7
     Indochina * 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Middle East 2.5 0.0 3.4 2.7 6.7 5.6 1.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Eastern Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 World 4.7 4.1 4.5 3.3 3.7 5.2 5.7 5.6 6.0 5.9
 Japan 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 2.6 7.4 7.8 7.3 7.4 8.1
 United States 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.4 3.0 2.6 3.2 3.8
 EU 0.5 1.2 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.8
 ASEAN # 2.8 3.7 6.9 7.2 8.5 5.7 5.3 5.9 6.1 6.3
     Indochina * 21.3 20.2 19.6 24.9 24.0 30.0 26.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Middle East 1.4 1.0 1.0 6.2 17.1 25.5 30.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Eastern Europe 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.2 1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 World 1.6 2.4 1.3 2.1 2.6 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.3 5.0
 Japan 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.5
 United States 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
 EU 8.5 8.6 7.9 7.5 9.5 17.4 17.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 ASEAN # 3.8 3.6 2.7 2.4 3.6 1.5 2.4 3.1 3.0 2.4
     Indochina * 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Middle East 0.4 0.1 53.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 Eastern Europe 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 2.9 2.9 3.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
 World 3.2 2.5 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.4 4.7 5.0 4.7
Notes： #：Including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.
　 　 　   *：Including Myanmar.
　       n.a.：not available.





Table 10　Exchange Rates of Japanese Yen to US Dollar ※
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3.    A soaring share of the home currency in Thai non-banking external debts 
 
      There is one interesting trend that should not be overlooked. That is a soaring ratio of “Other 
Currencies” to the non-banking external debts as shown in Table 2. The main currency among 
“Other Currencies” is the Thai baht. The non-banking sector usually borrows the baht from 
non-residents who have the Non-Resident Baht Accounts and/or have earned proceeds in the baht 
by selling Thai stocks and debt securities. 
12) Table 11 lists the ratios of the baht to non-banking 
external debts. It is clear from the table that both the share and amount of the baht soared after the 
crisis. The Bank of Thailand also took note of the growing share of the baht as it states in its report, 
“Recent evidences suggest that more debt newly contracted is denominated mostly in Baht.” 
13) 
Another significant trend captured in Table 11 is a sharp decline in the share and amount of US 
dollars. It is apposite to interpret that the Thai non-banking sector switched from the US dollar to 
its home currency when it borrowed money externally. 
      The shift from the US dollar to the baht is evident from a different perspective as well. Table 12 
looks at the currency composition of funds that Japanese manufacturers in Thailand raised for 
their capital investments. After the devaluation of the baht, the share of the US dollar plunged, 
that of the Japanese yen rose, and that of the Thai baht skyrocketed, respectively. What this 
signifies is that the Japanese manufacturers in Thailand changed fundraising currencies from the 
US dollar to the Japanese yen, but even at a larger percentage to the Thai baht. The baht virtually 
became the “home currency” for those Japanese manufacturers resident in Thailand. Their debts 
were overwhelmingly denominated in their “home currency” in the place of the US dollar and the 
Japanese yen. When they borrowed the baht, they procured it mostly from the Thai domestic 
market, which is, of course, not included in the statistics of external debts.   
      There are two possible reasons that explain why the non-banking sector shifted from the US 
dollar to the home currency. (1) The non-banking sector had borrowed a large sum of US dollars, 
and the devaluation of the baht landed this sector in colossal exchange losses. Upon the 
introduction of the floating rate system in Thailand, the non-banking sector tried to avert 
exchange risk by holding liabilities in the home currency. (2) The interest rates of the baht 
plummeted drastically. As a result, borrowing the baht turned out much cheaper than before. 
      Finally, we take another look at Table 9 to examine Thailand’s exports to its trading partners. 
The baht-denominated exports were on the rise not only to Japan but also to other trading 
partners. There are three reasons for this: (1) a concern over exchange risk, which could be a reality 
from a possible rebound of the baht, led exporters to denominate their exports in the home 
currency; (2) low interest rates of the baht, as in the case with the yen, contributed to reducing 
costs of trade financing; and (3) exporters hedged exchange risk by repaying their 
           
12)    The information was obtained from the author’s interviews with the Bank of Thailand. 
13)    Bank of Thailand [3], p.17. 106  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review 
 






































Table 11　Thailand's Private Non-bank External Debts by Currency ※
Unit：%, (in millions of US$)
At
year-end
1994 3.6 620) (      91.4 15,744) (   5.0 n.a. (   n.a.) 100 17,225) (  
1995 1.9 727) (      94.3 36,101) (   3.8 n.a. (   n.a.) 100 38,283) (  
1996 4.9 2,254) (    92.1 42,375) (   3.0 n.a. (   n.a.) 100 46,010) (  
1997 16.9 7,027) (    83.8 34,846) (   -0.7 n.a. (   n.a.) 100 41,582) (  
1998 13.7 5,689) (    79.2 32,777) (   7.1 2,927) (    3.1 1,279) (    100 41,394) (  
1999 16.2 5,987) (    77.2 28,496) (   6.6 2,447) (    2.9 1,062) (    100 36,930) (  
2000 12.8 3,885) (    76.2 23,114) (   11.0 3,347) (    8.0 2,417) (    100 30,346) (  
2001 10.0 2,664) (    73.2 19,396) (   16.8 4,452) (    12.1 3,220) (    100 26,512) (  
2002 11.4 2,763) (    65.2 15,841) (   23.5 5,707) (    17.0 4,121) (    100 24,311) (  
2003 12.5 3,017) (    56.2 13,609) (   31.4 7,601) (    23.7 5,738) (    100 24,227) (  
Notes： ※：The amount of trade credit is excluded from the debts of the non-banking sector (i.e., the debts of
　　　　       the non-banking sector from 1994 to 1997 exclude the amount of trade credit that was included in
                    the data of Annual Economic Report released by the Bank of Thailand.).
　　　　       The above figures in/after end-1998 are respectively based on BOT's data adjusted after its new data
　　　　       collection. Also, BOT's data from end-1995 to end-1997 are adjusted to reflect its new data collection.
            n.a.：not available.
Sources： The author's interviews with Bank of Thailand, Bank of Thailand, Economic and Financial Statistics,
                  various issues, Bank of Thailand, Annual Economic Report, various issues.
Thai Baht
Yen Total US Dollar Others
Table 12　Currency Composition of Funds for Capital Investments raised by Japanese
                   Manufacturers in Thailand ※
Unit：%
Years US Dollar Yen Thai Baht Others
#1997 62 9 28 0
1997 53 21 26 1
1998 38 28 34 0
1999 27 24 49 0
2000 9 23 68 0
2001 15 15 70 0
2002 19 12 69 0
2003 15 16 68 0
Notes ： ※：Based on actual transactions, not on projected figures.
　 　　      #：Based on actual transactions immediately before the introduction of the floating of the Baht.
Sources： Committee of Economic Research, Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, “Survey on Business
          　　Performances by Japanese Corporations in Thailand,” SHOHO, various issues.  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review  107 
 
4.    Increasing local contents of Japanese products manufactured in Thailand 
 
   We have so far discussed measures that the non-banking sector took after the Asian crisis; 
that is, the shift of denominations of their liabilities. In this section, the author focuses on Japanese 
manufacturers in Thailand to examine how they adjusted or had to adjust their business 
accordingly. Did they pursue any other measures? 
      As noted earlier, most Japanese manufacturers had a large amount of debts in US dollars at the 
time of the crisis. Thus, the crash of the Thai baht dealt a blow to them, inflicting huge exchange 
losses. In addition, domestic sales in Thailand shriveled, while the prices of parts and raw 
materials mainly from Japan soared due to the depreciation of the baht. With a contracting market 
demand at hand, the manufacturers could not resort to mark-ups to offset inflated costs. 
Consequently, the companies that had been selling their products solely in the Thai local market 
ran up huge deficits, and such companies became increasingly insolvent. 
14)  
   The  December  1997 issue of  SHOHO, a monthly report published by the Japanese Chamber of 
Commerce, Bangkok assessed the state of affairs of Japanese companies in Thailand. The Chamber 
carried out a special investigation in the autumn of that year and compiled its findings under the 
title “Survey on Business Performances by Japanese Corporations in Thailand (Autumn 1997 
Special Survey): the Findings of the Survey on the Effects of the Depreciation of the Thai Baht.” 
The survey covers both manufacturers and non-manufacturers operating in Thailand and points 
out  the  following:   
The declining value of the baht has adversely affected 80 percent of the Japanese companies 
surveyed. The depreciation caused severer damage to those of them who produced 
exclusively for the local market or whose local sales were larger than their sales abroad. 
Among the companies that had a higher ratio of export receipts than local sales, those who 
had a higher percentage of local contents than imported supplies were not so much affected 
by the depreciation or rather enjoyed its effects, whereas others with a higher proportion of 
imported supplies than local contents suffered more. A drop in the sales of many businesses 
had actually begun to surface even before the depreciation of the baht, and after the 
depreciation the demand of the local market shrunk rapidly, which made a big dent in their 
sales. To add to this, both rising import costs triggered by the depreciation and exchange 
losses resulted from external debts ended up with depressed earnings. 
15)  
   The causes to which the manufacturers and non-manufacturers attributed their declined 
earnings were multiple, but there were specific tendencies among different types of business.   
Of all the respondents, 59% attributed the decline in their earnings to higher costs of 
imports, 57% attributed it to heavy exchange losses from their external liabilities, and 51% 
to a sales decline since before the depreciation. Out of the above three commonly found 
           
14)    The information was obtained from the author’s interviews with Japanese manufacturers in Thailand. 
15)    Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok [11], p.62. 108  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review 
 
causes, the manufacturers of electric and electronic machinery, chemicals, and automobiles 
mainly attributed the reduced earnings to soaring costs of imported supplies; chemical and 
steel/nonferrous industries to exchange losses; and automobiles to a sales decline since 
before the depreciation. 
16)  
      In order to get out of the quagmire, the manufacturers that used to produce solely for the Thai 
local market had no other option but sell their products abroad. Those who used to import raw 
materials and parts had to find local suppliers to cut inflated costs. To localize production costs 
(i.e., to increase local contents) became crucially important to the Japanese manufacturers in 
Thailand.  
      The above survey also inquired about measures the respondents took to remedy the situation. 
Here again, the steps both the manufacturers and non-manufacturers took were multiple, but 
there were specific tendencies among different types of business. The following two quotes from 
the SHOHO report explain: 
1. Measures taken to deal with the sluggish sales: Of all the respondents, 56% raised prices, 
33% shifted from the local to overseas markets, and 24% took no particular steps yet. 
According to the survey results sorted out by type of business, “raising prices” had the 
highest percentage of the replies among all the manufacturers except food makers, while 
“reducing export prices” had the highest percentage among the food makers. In the case of 
manufacturers of textile and automobiles, “shifting from the local to overseas markets” had 
also a high percentage of replies. 
17)  
2. Concerning the procurement of raw materials and parts, 51% of both manufacturers and 
non-manufacturers answered that they turned away from import to local procurement, 
33% took no particular steps yet, and 27% responded they re-examined their suppliers to 
increase local contents. The share of local procurement in 1997 was 38% among 
manufacturers, whereas their projected ratio of local contents for 1998 was down to 36%. 
Those figures indicate why as many as 33% answered no particular steps taken yet. Many 
manufacturers actually wanted to switch to local suppliers as soon as possible but 
projected it would be difficult to do so within a short span of time. As for the replies by 
type of business, “shifting from import to local procurement” had a high percentage among 
all the manufacturers except textile and steel/nonferrous industries, and 43% of the textile 
manufacturers re-examined their suppliers to increase local contents, and “no particular 
steps yet” had the highest percentage among the steel and nonferrous industries. 
18)  
   In the January 1998 issue of SHOHO 
19) one Japanese car manufacturer referred to the 
above-mentioned measures as follows:   
We have experienced a drastic drop in our production since August, and had to suspend 
           
16)    Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok [11], p.67. 
17)
   Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok [11], p.74. 
18)    Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok [11], p.72. 
19)    Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok [12], p.51-52.   I. Inoue / Public Policy Review  109 
 
the operation from mid-November to the end of December.… At present, our local contents 
account for somewhere around 50%. Meanwhile, the baht has depreciated by 40 percent. 
When we take into account the hikes of various taxes on top of everything else, we will 
have to bump up the prices by about 40%. A large markup will be inevitable next year.… To 
muddle through this, Japanese car manufacturers are trying to expand overseas markets. A 
big concern for each of us is to figure out how to recover our production, including that of 
our suppliers. At the same time, we need to contribute to Thailand by earning foreign 
currencies. This is our social obligation to our host country.… Needless to say, it takes time 
to shift to export. If you came to Thailand to make your Thai operation as a hub for 
overseas markets, you wouldn’t find any difficulty to export. But if you didn’t, you ought to 
reorganize your production lines in order to meet varying demands of your potential 
customers abroad. You have to start from the ground up.   
   Concerning Japanese consumer-electronics manufacturers in Thailand, the same SHOHO 
article points out the following:     
Although most manufacturers want to mark up their products for the local market, 
stagnant sales do not allow them to do so. Many actually wanted to raise prices by 10% in 
October [1997 – noted by the author], but the markup was not materialized in the prices at 
outlets.… In the meantime, the makers are trying to reduce costs. They are geared towards 
increasing local contents as many as possible, while looking for any other means to cut 
costs -- for example, replacing Japanese staff with local personnel and trying to minimize 
liabilities. 
20)  
      Concerning the efforts made by the automobile industry, another issue of SHOHO wrote a year 
later:  
Car manufacturers are intensifying their efforts to develop new markets abroad, and in fact 
their exports have increased significantly. However, they are struggling to find a way to 
boost local contents, hoping to raise them from the present 42% on average to 44% in 
1999…. 
21)  
   Table 13 categorizes shipments of Japanese manufacturers in Thailand into two destinations, 
local and overseas, to compare the share of local shipments with that of exports. Table 14 shows 
where the manufacturers purchased raw materials and parts to compare local contents with 
imports. Immediately after the Asian crisis, the share of exports shot up, although in recent years 
Thailand’s economic recovery somewhat pushed up local shipments. Also, the share of local 
contents was constantly on the rise after 1997, clearly indicating that Japanese manufacturers were 
successful in localizing production costs. The trend shown in Table 14 is noteworthy as proof of 
increased local contents. 
      Japanese multinationals have established their production networks across ASEAN. The fuller 
           
20)    Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok [12], p.53-54. 
21)    Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok [13], p.39. 110  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review 
 
those companies are localized, the more they procure parts and raw materials locally. Their local 
contents will increase steadily when supporting industries are either relocated from Japan to 
ASEAN or created locally. 
22) The Asian crisis accelerated this trend. It should be noted that when 
local contents grow, the Japanese corporations in Thailand prefer the local currency for their 
export settlement to avoid exchange risk. 
23) The rise in the share of the baht receipts captured in 






























           
22)    Inoue, Ichiro [14], p.303. 
23)    Inoue, Ichiro [14], p.303. 
Table 13　Destinations of Shipments of Japanese Products Manufactured in Thailand ※
Unit：%
Years Local Market Export Total
1995 59.6 40.4 100
1996 57.5 42.5 100
1997 46.7 53.3 100
1998 40.6 59.4 100
1999 54.9 45.1 100
2000 50.3 49.7 100
2001 62.7 37.3 100
2002 64.8 35.2 100
2003 67.2 32.8 100
Note： ※：Based on actual shipments, not on projected figures.
Sources： Committee of Economic Research, Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, “Survey on Business
          　　Performances by Japanese Corporations in Thailand,” SHOHO, various issues.
Table 14　Origins of Raw Materials and Parts for Japanese Products Manufactured in Thailand ※
Unit：%
Years Local Contents Import Total
1995 38.0 61.9 100
1996 40.8 59.2 100
1997 40.0 60.0 100
1998 43.8 56.2 100
1999 51.6 48.4 100
2000 51.1 48.9 100
2001 54.9 45.1 100
2002 59.4 40.6 100
2003 54.8 45.2 100
Note： ※：Based on actual imports, not on projected figures.
Sources： Committee of Economic Research, Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, “Survey on Business
          　　Performances by Japanese Corporations in Thailand,” SHOHO, various issues.  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review  111 
 
II.  BIS reporting banks’ branches lend more local currencies in the Asia-Pacific 




   In the previous chapter, the author focused on Thailand and pointed out that the Thai 
non-banking sector reduced the share of US dollar-denominated debts while it raised the share of 
debts in the yen and the baht. In this chapter, the author refers to statistics published by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) to clarify that not only Thailand but the Asia-Pacific region as 
a whole have borrowed more local currencies since the Asian crisis. The discussion here centers on 
the following three points: (1) in the case of Thailand, the ratio of Japanese banks’ local claims in 
the local currency is increasing vis-à-vis their total claims on the country; (2) in other parts of 
Asia and the Pacific area as well, the share of Japanese banks’ local claims in local currencies is on 
the rise; and (3) the same trend as Japanese banks is true for banks of other industrialized nations 
that have claims on Asian and Pacific nations.   
 
1.    Expanded and refined coverage of BIS international banking statistics   
 
   The debt crisis in Latin America in the early 1980s urged BIS to compile new international 
banking statistics called “International Claims by Nationality 
24) of Reporting Banks on Countries 
Outside the Reporting Area.” 
25) The new statistics allow BIS to assess the extent of credit risk that 
BIS reporting banks may be exposed to in financing countries outside reporting areas, particularly 
developing countries. 
26)  
   In the new statistics, for example, when Japan (the Japanese reporting banks) has 
“International Claims” on Thailand, BIS takes stock of Japan’s total claims on Thailand based on:   
(1) the cross-border claims on Thailand that the Japanese banks’ head offices and branches in 
Japan have in all currencies; (2) the cross-border claims on Thailand that the Japanese banks’ 
overseas branches and affiliates, except those located in Thailand, have in all currencies; and (3) 
the local claims on Thailand that the banks’ branches and affiliates resident in Thailand have in 
           
24)    BIS has the following definition to determine the nationalities of banks. If a bank’s head office is located in a BIS 
reporting country (A), that bank is defined as an A-nationality bank. If a bank does not have its headquarters in A, even 
when its branches and affiliates are operating there, the bank is not categorized as A-nationality. As long as a bank’s head 
office is in A, the bank’s branches and affiliates spread across the world are all classified as A-nationality. Under BIS rules, 
a bank of a reporting country is obliged to report its data to BIS. 
25)    In BIS statistics called “International Claims by Nationality of Reporting Banks on Countries Outside the Reporting 
Area,” BIS reporting areas were made up of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States – 
totaling 18 nations (as of April 1995). Refer to BIS [15]. The BIS reporting areas were later joined by Hong Kong, India, 
Portugal, Singapore, Taiwan, and Turkey, totaling 24 nations and regions. Refer to BIS [16] and [17]. 
26)    Besides developing countries, the BIS statistics later began to include reporting countries as loan recipients. Refer to 
BIS [16] and [17]. 112  I. Inoue / Public Policy Review 
non-local currencies. 
27) However, BIS found it still necessary to expand the coverage of its 
international banking statistics and decided to incorporate reporting banks’ local claims in local 
currencies. In the March 2002 issue of BIS Quarterly Review: International banking and financial market 
developments, BIS explains why the expansion became inevitable: 
Local claims in local currency account for a large, and in some countries rapidly growing 
[author’s emphasis], proportion of reporting banks’ total foreign claims. The inclusion of 
such claims therefore makes for a sounder basis for the analysis of the country risk faced by 
the reporting countries’ banking systems. 
28)  
   As a result, starting with the BIS Quarterly Review, June 2002 issue, BIS has begun to list two 
classifications of claims. One is “International Claims,” which covers the total of the above (1), (2) 
and (3). The other is “Foreign Claims,” which adds to the total of those three a fourth category: the 
local claims that reporting banks’ local branches and affiliates have in local currencies. 
29)  
 
2.    A growing share of local claims in local currencies held by Japanese banks resident 
in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
   Based on the above two types of statistics, we can compute the share of baht-denominated 
claims that Japanese banks’ branches and affiliates 
30) in Thailand have vis-à-vis their total Foreign 
Claims on Thailand. First, with the equation γ＝(α−β) we can get the amount of 
baht-denominated claims of Japanese banks resident in Thailand (γ) by deducting the amount of 
their International Claims on Thailand (β) from the amount of their Foreign Claims on the 
country (α). Next, the ratio of Japanese banks’ baht-denominated claims vis-à-vis their Foreign 
Claims on Thailand is obtained by dividing γ by α. Chart 1 shows the chronological 
development of the share of baht-denominated claims that Japanese banks in Thailand had from 
end-June 1992 to end-December 2003. The share of the baht grew rapidly after the crisis. As 
discussed earlier, the depreciation of the baht prompted Japanese manufacturers operating in 
Thailand to change fundraising currencies from the US dollar to the yen and more so to the baht. 
The manufacturers’ growing demand for the baht seems to be related to the rising share of 
Japanese banks’ local claims in the local currency. One can surmise that Japanese banks’ local 
branches financed the Japanese manufacturers increasingly in the baht as the manufacturers raised 
funds more in the local currency than before for their capital investments (i.e., new facilities),  
           
27)    As International Claims in the BIS statistics are on a consolidated basis, the statistics take no account of the 
inter-office transactions between the head office of a bank and its overseas branches/affiliates, nor among its overseas 
branches/affiliates. Refer to BIS [15] and [16]. 
28)  B I S   [ 1 8 ] ,   p . A 5 .  
29)    Refer to Table 9B and Table 9C in BIS [19]. It should be noted that a currency composition is not available in those 
statistics. In the case of the statistics the Bank of Japan compiles for its own survey on International Claims of Japanese 
banks, BOJ gives, for reference, their local claims in local currencies. 








































                     Sources： BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, various
                                 issues, BIS, International banking and  financial market developments, various issues, BIS website.
                   
Chart 1　Share of Japanese Banks' Local Claims in Thai Baht vis-à-vis those
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                     Sources： BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, various
                                     issues, BIS, International banking and financial market developments, various issues, BIS website.
                 
Chart 2　Share of Japanese Banks' Local Claims in Local Currencies vis-à-vis
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which were designed to boost the share of local contents in the wake of the depreciation of the 
baht.  
      Now, look at Table 7 again. After the bad loan problem and particularly after the Asian crisis, 
Japanese banks in Thailand sharply reduced their “BIBF Liabilities,” but rapidly increased their 
“Net Inter-Office Balances.” However, that increase peaked out in 1999 and the borrowing from 
their headquarters dwindled thereafter. On the other hand, the ratios and amounts of “Deposits” 
and “Issued & Paid-up Capital” soared after the crisis. This indicates that Japanese banks’ local 
branches did not raise funds by swapping US dollars or the yen for the baht but rather increased 
local deposits from their clients, namely, the baht-denominated deposits, to meet their clients’ 
demand for the local currency.   
      Thailand’s financial regulations on lending to large customers stipulate “the amount of credit 
extended by commercial banks to any single customer must not exceed 25% of their capital funds.” 
The BIBF offshore market, however, is exempted from the rule, allowing large bank lending in 
foreign currencies. Even so, Japanese banks in Thailand could not take advantage of BIBF to bypass 
the rule after the crisis because their clients almost exclusively requested baht-denominated loans. 
This explains why the increase in the share and amount of “Issued & Paid-up Capital” shot up 
after the crisis.   
   Chart 2 illustrates the trends of the ratios of local claims in local currencies that Japanese 
banks’ branches in the Asia-Pacific region had vis-à-vis their total Foreign Claims on the region. 
31) The Asian crisis led to a soaring share of local currencies not just in Thailand but elsewhere in 
the entire region. 
 
3.  Non-Japanese reporting banks resident in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
      The trend of a rising share of local claims in local currencies is also prominent in non-Japanese 
reporting banks operating in the Asia-Pacific region. Table 15 lists the ratios of local claims in local 
currencies that Japanese and other reporting countries’ local branches had on the Asia-Pacific 
region vis-à-vis their total Foreign Claims on the region. 
32) The ratios of the 
local-currency-denominated claims of the five countries (France, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) increased after the crisis. Worth noticing are the growing 
ratios of British and Dutch banks respectively. Regarding U.S. banks, since they do not include 
“local claims in non-local currencies” in International Claims as done by the other five nations, we 
cannot get the amount of U.S. banks’ local claims in local currencies by the equation  γ＝(α−β). 
Thus, the ratios of U.S. banks listed in Table 15 are of the combined figures between local and 
non-local currencies. However, the fact that their branches’ local claims increased after the crisis 
           
31)    As Foreign Claims on Thailand are shown in Chart 1, Chart 2 excludes Thailand. 
32)    The six countries in Table 15 were the top six in terms of the amount of Foreign Claims on the Asia-Pacific region. 
Japan’s Foreign Claims include those on Thailand.   I. Inoue / Public Policy Review  115 
 
suggests that the share of their local claims in local currencies would have correspondingly grown. 
Chart 3 excludes U.S. banks and adds up the remaining five countries’ ratios of local claims in local 

























                   Note： The five countries are France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
                   Sources： BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, various
                                issues, BIS, International banking and financial market developments, various issues, BIS website.
                    
Chart 3　Share of BIS Reporting Banks' Local Claims in Local Currencies vis-à
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Table 15　Share of BIS Reporting Banks' Local Claims in Local Currencies vis-à-vis those banks' Foreign Claims on the Asia-Pacific Region ※
Unit：%, (in millions of US$)
Nationalities 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 France 9.7( 20,532) 11.8( 21,373) 10.8( 26,572) 8.8( 34,637) 8.0( 41,462) 6.0( 45,858) 6.2( 36,505) 9.1( 35,852) 11.2( 30,597) 14.7( 25,974) 26.6( 29,175) 29.7( 36,622)
 Germany * 13.4( 12,355) 12.5( 14,262) 6.9( 22,893) 8.3( 34,675) 7.2( 46,157) 6.3( 53,498) 6.6( 44,375) 8.6( 48,411) 10.7( 44,156) 10.0( 44,622) 12.4( 46,312) 12.6( 55,516)
 Japan 9.4( 74,437) 8.7( 79,609) 7.9(101,332) 5.9(120,010) 5.9(126,038) 5.6(121,683) 6.8( 92,950) 9.2( 72,286) 12.3( 63,543) 14.7( 58,667) 18.5( 49,928) 20.5( 52,356)
 Netherlands 29.9(  5,190) 29.6(  6,352) 22.0(  8,839) 17.5( 11,201) 16.8( 15,534) 14.4( 20,362) 28.0( 26,709) 38.7( 28,619) 40.6( 24,055) 41.7( 23,377) 47.9( 27,753) 46.9( 38,311)
 United Kingdom 40.2( 12,153) 40.4( 22,384) 40.3( 26,636) 36.5( 32,418) 37.7( 42,364) 38.1( 52,145) 42.5( 50,074) 49.2( 51,467) 55.4( 56,706) 57.6( 57,747) 59.9( 65,816) 59.5( 81,301)
 United States + 53.1( 30,943) 54.3( 37,563) 54.7( 45,050) 50.4( 52,151) 46.9( 64,973) 54.3( 65,944) 65.0( 59,451) 64.9( 63,595) 67.3( 63,020) 65.7( 62,971) 68.9( 64,118) 62.0( 76,675)
 Total of Five Countries # 13.7(124,667) 15.4(143,980) 13.5(186,272) 11.5(232,941) 12.0(271,555) 12.2(293,546) 16.1(250,613) 21.3(236,635) 26.1(219,057) 28.5(210,387) 34.5(218,984) 35.9(264,106)
Notes： ※：Based on the data at year-end. The figures in brackets are the total Foreign Claims that the banks of each nationality have on the Asia-Pacific region.
                 *：The figures of Germany are not completely on a consolidated basis.
                 +：The United States does not report to BIS a currency breakdown for local claims. The U.S. local claims in non-local currencies are included in Foreign Claims, instead of International
                     Claims, and the local claims are of the aggregate of both local currencies and non-local currencies. Therefore, the above ratios of the Unites States are those of the local claims in local
                     and non-local currencies that U.S. banks had vis-à-vis their total Foreign Claims on the Aisa-Pacific region.
                #：Excludes the figures of the United States.

































































Table 16　Lending Interest Rates in the Asia-Pacific Region ※
Unit：%
Countries 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
China 8.64  10.98  10.98  12.06  10.08  8.64  6.39  5.85  5.85  5.85  5.31  5.31 
Republic of Korea 10.0   8.6   8.5   9.0   8.8   11.9   15.3   9.4   8.5   7.7   6.8   6.2  
Taiwan, Province of China 8.30  8.01  7.94  7.67  7.38  7.50  7.70  7.67  7.71  7.38  7.10  3.43 
Indonesia 24.03  20.59  17.76  18.85  19.22  21.82  32.15  27.66  18.46  18.55  18.95  16.94 
Malaysia 9.31  9.05  7.61  7.63  8.89  9.53  10.61  7.29  6.77  6.66  6.39  6.13 
Philippines 19.479 14.683 15.057 14.682 14.840 16.276 16.777 11.776 10.907 12.402 9.139 9.472
Thailand 12.17  11.17  10.90  13.25  13.40  13.65  14.42  8.98  7.83  7.25  6.88  5.94 
India 18.92  16.25  14.75  15.46  15.96  13.83  13.54  12.54  12.29  12.08  11.92  11.46 
United States 6.25  6.00  7.14  8.83  8.27  8.44  8.35  7.99  9.23  6.92  4.68  4.12 
Japan 6.15  4.41  4.13  3.40  2.66  2.45  2.32  2.16  2.07  1.97  1.86  1.82 
Note： ※：Annual averages except for China and Taiwan, whose rates are those at year-end.




   As examined in the previous three sections, local currencies evidently gained prominence in 
Foreign Claims on the Asia-Pacific region after the Asian financial and currency crisis. To 
summarize quickly:  (1) Japanese banks resident in Thailand increased their local claims in the 
Thai baht; (2) Japanese banks also increased the share of local currencies elsewhere in the 
Asia-Pacific region; and (3) the same is true with the non-Japanese reporting banks as they 
increased the share of local currencies in the region. The trend signifies that the Asia-Pacific region 
began to opt to borrow their home currencies instead of US dollars because (a) the crisis made 
the region very sensitive to borrowing US dollars because of possible exchange risk and (b) 
domestic interest rates in many countries in the region fell sharply to match those of the US dollar 
after the crisis (see Table 16). 
33) Lending local currencies has since taken on a decisively important 
meaning for BIS reporting banks operating in the region. 
34)  
  As shown in Table 15, Japanese banks’ Foreign Claims on the Asia-Pacific region decreased as 
the non-performing loan problem deepened in Japan, and shrunk as the effects of the Asian crisis 
permeated the region. Chart 4 shows Foreign Claims of U.S., British, German, Japanese, and Dutch 
reporting banks on the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese banks overwhelmed banks from the other 
four countries before the crisis. However, Japanese banks’ Foreign Claims on the region peaked out 
in 1996 and plummeted thereafter, while the non-Japanese reporting banks’ Foreign Claims 
respectively edged up. Japanese banks fell behind American banks in 2001, British banks in 2002, 
and German banks in 2003. Chart 5 compares the ratios of local claims in local currencies that 
British, Dutch, and Japanese banks had on the Asia-Pacific region. The gap of the ratios between 
Japanese banks and the other two widened remarkably after the crisis. Besides such a gap in the 
share of local claims in local currencies, the aggregate amount of Japanese banks’ Foreign Claims 
on the region dwindled at a rapid pace as shown in Chart 4. In the end, Dutch banks overtook 
their Japanese counterparts in 1998 in terms of the amount of local claims in local currencies on the 
region as in Chart 6. These tables and charts highlight the depth and extent of the detrimental 
impact that the bad loan problem exerted on Japanese banks. 
           
33)    Besides the two reasons mentioned in the text, the liberalization of financial markets in Asia and Pacific nations, as 
well as bankruptcies and foreign takeover of domestic banks as a result of the Asian crisis had also played a certain role, but 
not significant enough to list as reasons to explain the changeover to the local currencies. 
34)    As an effective measure to ward off exchange risk, bond markets that transact in local currencies must be developed in 
Asia. According to Yoneyama, Yusuke [21], “When companies in Asia issue corporate bonds for fundraising, they do so 
mostly in the US dollar. The problem is that the fluctuation of local currencies’ exchange rates to the US dollar is bound to 
undermine financial plans of those companies. Japanese Finance Minister Shiokawa expressed concern that too much 
reliance on the US dollar in the issuance of bonds could give undesirable effects to the Asian economy. He announced that 
Japan would propose a plan to develop Asian bond markets to avoid such risk in the coming Senior Official Meeting of 








































                       Sources： BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, various issues, BIS,
                                  International banking and financial market developments, various issues, BIS website.
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                                                Sources： BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, various issues, BIS,
                                                      International banking and financial market developments, various issues, BIS website.
                                 
Chart 5　Share of British, Dutch, and Japanese Banks' Local Claims in Local
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   The Asian financial and currency crisis triggered a significant change to the currency 
composition of private liabilities in Thailand. Namely, the Thai private sector switched the 
denominations from the US dollar to the yen and at a larger percentage to the home currency (the 
Thai baht). The private sectors elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region also switched from the US 
dollar to home currencies. Countries in the region examined the crisis and their heavy 
dependency on the US dollar. Their currency switch can be construed as a movement away 
from that dependency. The author believes that such a movement should not be temporary, 
35) 
but should firmly take root. 
           
35)    Such a movement will be influenced by the fluctuation of interest rates and foreign exchange rates. 
                     Sources： BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International Bank Lending, various issues, BIS,
                                International banking and financial market developments, various issues, BIS website.
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